ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE LOGISTICS OF THE MACEDONIAN ARMY by Donald Engels

University of California Press 1992. ISBN 978-0520042728

Donald Engels provides a useful counterweight the the numerous military strategic accounts of Alexander's conquests.

He deals with the neglected subject of ancient world military logistics and concludes that 1) Alexander's campaign routes and timing were logistically determined 2) when a logistic plan failed, it could destroy an army as surely as a military defeat, an example being the loss of 3/4 of his army in the Gedrosian desert when the Monsoon winds halted supply by sea.

The essence of Alexander's strategy was the fast movement of troops with the smallest baggage train possible, achieved by his soldiers carrying much of their own equipment and being accompanied by horses and mules with supplies.		 The book provides interesting detailed calculations, showing that there was little margin for error. The army that crossed the Hellespont comprised of 65.000 personnel plus cavalry and pack animals that had a combined grain requirement (not counting water or fodder) of 269.000 lbs per day that had to be carried, delivered by river or sea or drawn from an extensive area of rich agricultural land after a harvest, facts which greatly determined when and where Alexander could proceed and how he had to divide his forces.